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Reducing Inequality of Opportunities 
in West African Urban Labor Markets: 
What Kinds of Policy Matter?
Laure Pasquier-Doumer
African labor markets are compartmentalized into segments with diff erent 
structures and mechanisms in terms of wages, job prospects, and job security 
(Brilleau, Roubaud, and Torelli 2005; Kuépié, Nordman, and Roubaud 2009; see 
chapter 6 of this book). For on understanding of the dynamics of the African 
labor market, it is therefore vital to understand what determines access to the 
diff erent segments.
Th e more labor market positioning depends on social origin, the less the prin-
ciple of equal opportunities defi ned by Rawls (1971) is respected. Th is principle 
reads as follows: “Assuming there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are 
at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospect of success regardless of their initial place in the 
social system” (p. 104). In addition to meeting a social justice goal, equality of 
opportunity in the labor market fulfi lls an economic effi  ciency function. Indeed, 
the World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development (World Bank 2005) 
identifi es the reduction of unequal opportunities as a core development policy 
issue. Reducing inequalities of opportunity in the labor market improves the 
allocation of human capital, directing it to where its returns are highest.
Th e economic and sociological literature fi nds a number of mechanisms at 
work behind the intergenerational transmission of labor market position. Par-
ents’ occupational status can directly aff ect their children’s occupational status 
through the transmission of physical capital, human capital, and social capital. 
In a credit-constrained environment, the inheritance of physical capital 
increases access to socioeconomic groups that require an initial investment 
(Banerjee and Newman 1993). Human capital can take various forms. One is 
knowledge of a trade (know-how). Another is information, including knowl-
edge of a professional environment, knowledge of the optimal actions to take 
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within it, and knowledge of one’s ability to work in certain occupations. Trans-
mission of this human capital can lead individuals to choose the same occupa-
tion as their parents (Galor and Tsiddon 1997; Hassler and Mora 2000; Sjögren 
2000). Parents also build social capital in the course of their work, in particular 
a social network and professional values that they can pass on to their children, 
making it easier for them to enter the profession in question (Lin, Vaughn, and 
Ensel 1981).
Parents’ occupational status can also indirectly infl uence their children’s 
position in the labor market by aff ecting the children’s level of education. Many 
studies show that social origin is decisive in the acquisition of education, par-
ticularly as a result of capital market imperfections and the intergenerational 
transmission of abilities (see Haveman and Wolfe [1995] for a review of the 
literature on this subject). Parents’ occupational status can condition both the 
resources they have available to educate their children and their children’s moti-
vation to study and the returns expected from that education.
Th e purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it compares the extent of 
inequality of labor market opportunities in seven West African commercial 
capitals: Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou. 
Th e extent of inequality of opportunities is defi ned here as the net association 
between individuals’ labor market positions and their fathers’ positions, irrespec-
tive of structural labor market eff ects. Th is comparison identifi es the character-
istics of the cities with the highest levels of inequality of opportunity, providing 
a basis for assessing theories explaining these diff erences.
Second, for each city, the chapter estimates the extent to which the eff ect of 
fathers’ occupational status is direct or indirect (through education). Th e public 
policy implications are extremely diff erent in the two cases. In the fi rst case, 
opportunity leveling policies need to focus directly on the labor market. In the 
second case, they need to focus upstream, on the education system.
Comparative studies of the inequality of opportunities and social mobility 
take a quantitative sociology approach, seeking to evaluate which factors explain 
cross-country diff erences. Because data are thin on the ground, there are almost 
no comparative studies of developing countries. Most studies look at devel-
oped countries (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). Only a few include develop-
ing countries in their databases (Grusky and Hauser 1984; Ganzeboom, Luijkx, 
and Treiman 1989), and the studies that do include them apply the same social 
stratifi cation used for developed countries. As numerous authors show, this 
stratifi cation does not consider the particularity of labor markets in developing 
countries, where the informal sector predominates (Benavides 2002; Pasquier-
Doumer 2005). Specifi c studies of developing countries are therefore needed to 
take account of the labor market structure in these countries. 
Although Africa has the largest income inequalities in the world aft er Latin 
America (World Bank 2005), to our knowledge, only three comparative studies 
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of the dynamics of these inequalities have been conducted in Africa (Bossuroy 
and Cogneau 2008; Cogneau and others 2007; Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 
2008). All draw on the same data, from representative surveys of fi ve African 
countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Uganda. Th e fi rst 
two studies look at social mobility; the third focuses on inequality of income 
opportunity. All run up against a comparability problem, because diff erent sur-
veys use diff erent occupational classifi cations, forcing the authors to aggregate 
occupations into just two groups, agricultural and nonagricultural activities. 
Lack of comparability is a major problem in most comparative studies of this 
kind, as Björklund and Jäntti (2000) show.
Th e 1-2-3 survey data (described in box O.1 in the overview) off er both 
highly detailed information on fathers’ occupational status and excellent com-
parability. Th ey can therefore be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the 
inequality of opportunities, incorporating a number of labor market aspects, 
including institutional sector and socioeconomic group.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section describes the data. Th e 
second section compares the degree of inequality of opportunities in access to 
institutional sectors in seven cities. Th e third section examines the role of edu-
cation in inequality of opportunities. Th e last section draws some conclusions.
The Data
Th is study examines the commercial capitals of the seven French-speaking 
countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU): 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Benin, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo are coastal countries, with a higher level of wealth 
on the whole than the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. 
Th e human development index draws an even sharper distinction between the 
two groups of countries (see annex table 8A.1).
Th e data used for each country are drawn from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys 
conducted in the commercial capitals of the WAEMU countries in 2001 and 
2002. Th e surveys indicate the level of education of each respondent’s mother 
and father, along with the father’s socioeconomic group, business type, and 
business sector when the respondent was 15.1 It is rare to fi nd such detail on the 
father’s occupational status in developing countries. Th e wording of the ques-
tions and the response options are identical in all surveys, making a robust and 
highly detailed comparison possible. Most studies on unequal opportunities 
have to make a trade-off  between detail and comparability. 
Th e data do not paint a representative picture of the labor market struc-
ture for the entire generation of fathers, as they include the occupational status 
only of fathers whose children were working in one of the seven West African 
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commercial capitals at the time of the survey. Nevertheless, they allow for anal-
ysis and cross-country comparison of the professional trends of families cur-
rently living in the main urban centers. In particular, they reveal the strength 
of the association between the labor market situation of these cities’ inhabit-
ants and their fathers—the measure of inequality of opportunities used in this 
study.2
Inequality of Opportunities across Cities
Th is section evaluates the extent to which one’s father’s institutional sector access 
conditions one’s own access to an institutional sector. Th e more conditioned the 
access is, the higher the degree of inequality of opportunities. Th e section then 
compares cities on the basis of this criterion, in order to understand what dif-
ferentiates cities with the least inequality of opportunities from other cities. 
Th e defi nition of institutional sectors used here is designed to refl ect the 
phenomenon of labor market segmentation (see chapter 6 of this book) in the 
WAEMU capitals, distinguishing between the formal and informal sector. Indi-
viduals are considered part of the informal sector if they work in an unreg-
istered business. We do not know whether the business in which the father 
worked was registered or not. We therefore consider fathers to have worked in 
the informal sector if they worked in a very small business, an association or 
other nonprofi t institution, a household, or self-employment. We then separate 
public and semi-public workers from private sector workers to test the assump-
tion that access to the public sector is more conditioned by social origin than 
is access to the formal private sector. Th e three sectors considered are therefore 
the public and semi-public sector, the formal private sector, and the informal 
sector.
Inequality of opportunities is defi ned as the link between the respondent’s 
institutional sector and his or her father’s institutional sector, irrespective of the 
distributions of respondents and fathers. Th is link captures net social mobility, 
also known as social fl uidity. Social fl uidity measures the change in the relative 
chances of individuals from diff erent social origins attaining a given social sta-
tus. An odds ratios analysis compares cities by level of social fl uidity.
Odds ratios refl ect the outcome of competition to enter one rather than 
another sector by individuals whose fathers worked in diff erent institutional 
sectors. More precisely, they represent the relative inequality between two indi-
viduals whose fathers worked in sector i and sector i’ in their chances of attain-
ing group j’ rather than j. Th e odds ratio is defi ned as 
 
OR
n n
n n
n n
n ni ij j
ij i
i j i j
ij i j
i j ij
−
−
= =’
’ ’ ’ ’
’ ’j ’
’ ’
/
/  (8.1)
REDUCING INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES IN WEST AFRICAN URBAN LABOR MARKETS  255
where nij is the number of observations in the cell (i, j) of the transition matrix, 
where row i represents the fathers’ three institutional sectors and column j the 
respondents’ institutional sectors. Th e odds of attaining sector j’ rather than j are 
OR i i
j j
−
−
’
’
times higher for an individual whose father worked in sector i’ than for an 
individual whose father worked in sector i. An odds ratio of 1 indicates 
that having a father in sector i’ secures no comparative advantage over hav-
ing a father in sector i when it comes to entering j’. Th e further the odds 
ratio is from 1, the lower the social fl uidity between two institutional sec-
tors. Th e particularity of odds ratios is that they provide a measurement 
of the statistical association between two variables regardless of the mar-
ginal distributions. Figure 8.1 presents the odds ratios for the seven cities. 
Comparison of the fi rst three panels of fi gure 8.1, summarized in the last 
panel, reveals that in most cities, the transition between the public sector and 
the informal sector is the least socially fl uid: the social distance between these 
sectors is generally much larger than the social distance between the public sec-
tor and the formal private sector or between the formal private sector and the 
informal sector. In most cities, the social distance between the formal private 
sector and the public sector is roughly the same as the social distance between 
the formal private sector and the informal sector. In Bamako, for example, an 
individual whose father worked in the public sector is about six times more 
likely to enter the public sector than an individual whose father worked in 
the informal sector and twice as likely as an individual whose father worked 
in the formal private sector; an individual whose father worked in the formal 
private sector is about twice as likely to work in the formal private sector as 
one whose father worked in the informal sector. Th e social distances between 
the formal private sector and the informal sector are not signifi cantly diff erent 
across cities, with the exception of Ouagadougou, where the social distance is 
signifi cantly larger than in Abidjan or Dakar. 
In terms of social fl uidity between the public sector and the formal private 
sector, two contrasting groups of cities are found: Niamey and Ouagadougou 
post signifi cantly higher social rigidity than Cotonou, Abidjan, and Dakar. In 
Niamey, having a father who worked in the public sector increases the chance 
that an individual works in the public sector by four times as much as having a 
father in the formal private sector. Th is ratio is a mere 1.1 in Abidjan, indicating 
virtual equality of opportunities of entering the formal private sector among 
individuals of public sector and private sector “origin.” Lomé and Bamako stand 
at the boundary between the two groups. 
Th e same groups are found when looking at fl uidity between the public 
sector and the informal sector, except in Bamako, which joins the group of 
least fl uid cities. In Cotonou, Lomé, and Dakar, the odds ratio averages 2.4; in 
 Niamey, Ouagadougou, and Bamako, it averages 5.3. 
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Uniform diff erence log-multiplicative (unidiff ) modeling, developed by Erik-
son and Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie (1992), is used to summarize these fi ndings 
and propose an ordering of the cities covering all three dimensions. Th is model-
ing provides a composite measure of how the association between two qualita-
tive variables—the respondent’s sector and the father’s sector—diff ers depending 
on a third variable, the city, regardless of the categories of the two qualitative 
variables considered. Th is composite measure is called the b, or intensity, param-
eter.3 Th e change in the intensity parameter therefore represents the intercity 
variation in social inequalities in access to an institutional sector. 
Th e parameter value for Dakar is set at 1. A parameter above (below) 1 repre-
sents a stronger (weaker) intensity of unequal opportunities. All the odds ratios 
between Dakar and the other city considered and for the three institutional 
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O
dd
s 
ra
ti
o
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/p
riv
at
e
Pr
iv
at
e/
in
fo
rm
al
Pu
bl
ic
/in
fo
rm
al
Dakar Cotonou Lomé Abidjan Bamako Niamey Ouaga.
a.Odds ratios between public sector
and formal private sector
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Co
ton
ou
Ab
idj
an
Da
ka
r
Lo
mé
Ba
ma
ko
Ou
ag
a.
Nia
me
yO
dd
s 
ra
ti
o 
pu
bl
ic
 v
s 
fo
rm
al
 p
ri
va
te
 
b. Odds ratios between public sector
and informal sector
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c. Odds ratios between formal private
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Figure 8.1 Odds Ratios for Three Institutional Sectors in Seven West African Cities
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
(AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. For each city, the median, represented by a diamond, corresponds 
to the odds ratio. The lower and upper limits, represented by the horizontal bars, correspond to the limits of a 
90 percent confidence interval. Ouaga. = Ouagadougou.
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sectors are assumed to increase with the same intensity bj. Th e signifi cance of 
the diff erences between each of the parameters was systematically tested and 
used to defi ne groups of cities. 
Inequality of opportunity in access to institutional sectors diff ers widely 
across the seven cities (fi gure 8.2). Two groups of cities emerge. Th e fi rst is 
made up of the coastal cities of Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé. Th e sec-
ond comprises Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou.4 Th e level of inequality of 
opportunity in these cities is nearly two-thirds higher than in the cities in the 
fi rst group. Abidjan and Bamako form a grey area between the two groups.5 
Th e cities in the group with the least social fl uidity are the capitals of coun-
tries that share certain characteristics (see annex table 8A.1). Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Niger are landlocked countries. Th ey have the lowest human development 
index rankings of the seven countries studied, the lowest levels of education and 
literacy, and the highest rates of mortality and malnutrition. Urbanization is 
lower in these countries, and their fertility index rankings are at least one point 
higher than the other four countries. 
Th ese fi ndings are consistent with the liberal theory of social mobility, which 
states that the more industrialized a society, the more meritocratic the labor 
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 8.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. The circles aggregate cities’ intensity parameters that are not 
 significantly different from one another. 
Figure 8.2 Parameters of Intensity of Link between Institutional Sector of Individuals and 
Their Fathers
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market selection criteria, because the increase in the demand for skilled labor 
and urbanization prompt geographic mobility and reduce the feeling of com-
munity (Parsons 1960; Blau and Duncan 1967; Treiman 1970). 
The Role of Education in Inequality of Opportunities
Th e above analysis provides no information on the causal link between the 
father’s institutional sector and his children’s sector. Is the eff ect direct, or does 
the father’s occupation aff ect other characteristics, such as the children’s level of 
education, which in turn infl uences access to an institutional sector?
Th is section considers a broader defi nition of social origin that includes 
place of birth and ethnic group and takes into account the individual’s level 
of education. It seeks to clarify the channel through which social origin aff ects 
access to an institutional sector.
We start by estimating a logit model for each city to explain the probability 
of entering one institutional sector rather than the two others based on four 
aspects of social origin (father’s institutional sector, whether the father went to 
school, individual’s place of birth, and individual’s ethnic group) while control-
ling for gender. Model 1 describes access to the public sector, model 3 access 
to the formal private sector, and model 5 access to the informal sector. Ethnic 
group is measured as membership in the city’s majority ethnic group, except in 
Abidjan, where we look at membership in the Akan, Krou, and Southern Man-
ding ethnic groups, in order to test the hypothesis of a social division of labor 
based on “ivoirité” (see chapter 9).6 We then estimate the same models including 
the respondents’ levels of education (models 2, 4, and 6). If social origin still 
has a signifi cant eff ect in these models, we conclude that it has a direct eff ect 
on access to the institutional sectors. If the eff ect is no longer signifi cant, we 
conclude that the eff ect of social origin is indirect. Table 8.1 presents the odds 
ratios obtained from estimation of the 42 (6 × 7) models.
Access to the Public Sector
In the least fl uid cities (Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), the father’s insti-
tutional sector has an eff ect on entry into the public sector, irrespective of its 
impact on the level of education (model 2). In these cities, other things equal, 
having a father who worked in the public sector rather than the informal sector 
increases the chances of working in the public sector by a factor of 2.2 in Bamako, 
1.6 in Ouagadougou, and 1.5 in Niamey. In the capitals of the three landlocked 
countries, the father’s occupational status thus has a direct eff ect on access to the 
public sector through a mechanism other than education (knowledge of the pro-
fessional environment, know-how, penchant for the public sector, and so forth).
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Table 8.1 Logit Estimation of Effects of Social Origin on Access to Public, Formal Private, 
and Informal Sectors in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable/city
Public sector Formal private sector Informal private sector
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Father in public or semi-public sector (reference = informal sector)
Abidjan 2.5* 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.6* 1.0
Bamako 4.0* 2.2* 1.0 0.8 0.3* 0.6*
Cotonou 1.2 0.8 2.9* 2.5* 0.4* 0.6*
Dakar 2.1* 1.1 1.8* 1.6* 0.4* 0.6*
Lomé 2.3* 1.4 1.8* 1.4 0.4* 0.6*
Niamey 3.0* 1.5* 2.2* 1.5 0.3* 0.5*
Ouagadougou 3.5* 1.6* 1.8* 1.3 0.3* 0.6*
Father in formal private sector (reference = informal sector)
Abidjan 2.0* 1.8* 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0
Bamako 2.3* 1.9* 1.0 0.9 0.6* 0.7
Cotonou 0.9 0.6 1.8* 1.4 0.8 1.3
Dakar 1.4* 1.1 1.5* 1.2 0.6* 0.8
Lomé 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.5 0.7 0.9
Niamey 0.8 0.4* 2.8* 2.5* 0.6 1.0
Ouagadougou 1.5 0.6 2.0* 1.5 0.5* 1.2
City of birth
Abidjan 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9
Bamako 1.0 0.8 1.7* 1.6* 0.8* 0.8
Cotonou 0.5* 0.5* 1.0 1.2 1.6* 1.4*
Dakar 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2
Lomé 0.6* 0.7* 0.9 0.8 1.5* 1.5*
Niamey 0.9 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.1
Ouagadougou 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Member of majority ethnic group
Abidjan (membership in the 
Akan, Krou, or Southern 
Manding ethnic group) 4.4* 2.2* 2.0* 1.4* 0.3* 0.5*
Bamako 1.0 1.2 0.7* 0.7 1.3* 1.1
Cotonou 1.4* 1.3* 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Dakar 0.9 0.9 0.7* 0.7* 1.4* 1.4*
Lomé 0.7* 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1
Niamey 1.2 1.4* 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8*
Ouagadougou 0.5* 1.0 0.5* 0.6* 2.5* 1.5
(continued next page)
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Gender (reference = female)
Abidjan 2.3* 1.2 4.6* 3.6* 0.2* 0.3*
Bamako 1.6* 1.1 6.8* 6.2* 0.3* 0.3*
Cotonou 3.1* 1.6* 4.8* 3.0* 0.2* 0.3*
Dakar 2.0* 1.6* 4.1* 4.2* 0.2* 0.2*
Lomé 3.4* 1.8* 5.8* 4.0* 0.2* 0.3*
Niamey 1.8* 1.3 4.6* 3.8* 0.3* 0.4*
Ouagadougou 2.1* 1.6* 2.9* 2.6* 0.3* 0.4*
Father attended school
Abidjan 1.2 0.7 2.0* 1.7 0.5* 0.7
Bamako 1.5* 0.9 1.3 1.2 0.6* 0.9
Cotonou 2.1* 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.5* 1.1
Dakar 1.6* 1.4* 1.8* 1.5 0.5* 0.6*
Lomé 1.1 0.6* 1.6* 1.3 0.7* 1.2
Niamey 1.7* 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.5* 1.1
Ouagadougou 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.3 0.7* 1.3
Completed primary school or incomplete lower-secondary school 
(reference = less than completed primary school)
Abidjan — 5.5* — 2.6 — 0.3*
Bamako — 3.4* — 1.4 — 0.5*
Cotonou — 5.1* — 2.2 — 0.3*
Dakar — 5.2* — 2.0 — 0.3*
Lomé — 3.4* — 2.5 — 0.3*
Niamey — 4.8* — 2.8 — 0.2*
Ouagadougou — 6.3* — 2.7 — 0.2*
Completed lower-secondary school or above 
(reference = less than completed primary school)
Abidjan — 25.0* — 2.8 — 0.9*
Bamako — 19.9* — 2.3 — 0.1*
Cotonou — 17.2* — 7.4 — 0.0*
Dakar — 13.2* — 2.9 — 0.1*
Lomé — 13.5* — 3.4 — 0.1*
Niamey — 18.1* — 3.3 — 0.0*
Ouagadougou — 24.5* — 3.5 — 0.0*
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see figure 8.1 for details).
Note: Figures are for individuals 35 and older. The interpretation of a cell is the following: In model 1, for Dakar, 
having a father in the public sector increases the odds of working in the public sector by 2.1 compared with 
having a father in the informal sector. This means that other things equal, the probability of working in the pub-
lic sector divided by the probability of not working in the public sector increases by 110 percent when the father 
worked in the public rather than the informal sector. — = not available.
* significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 8.1 (continued)
Public sector Formal private sector Informal private sector
Variable/city Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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In the more fl uid cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé), having a father 
who worked in the public sector has no direct eff ect on access to the public sec-
tor: once its eff ect on the level of education has been taken into account, the 
father’s institutional sector is no longer a determinant of entry into the public 
sector.7 We can therefore conclude that in Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, 
the father’s institutional sector plays an indirect role in providing access to the 
public sector by determining the level of education. However, other aspects of 
social origin also come into play.
In Bamako and Niamey, having a father in the formal private sector also 
has a signifi cant eff ect on accessing the public sector compared with having a 
father in the informal sector, but the eff ect is positive in Bamako and negative 
in Niamey. Th ese fi ndings refl ect the short social distance between the formal 
private and informal sectors in Niamey and between the public sector and the 
formal private sector in Bamako (see panel d in fi gure 8.1). Th is distance is also 
apparent when considering other aspects of social origin, level of education, 
and gender. 
In Niamey, inequality of opportunity is exacerbated by the signifi cant role 
played by ethnicity in access to the public sector. Everything else equal, belong-
ing to the Djerma ethnic group increases the probability of entering the public 
sector and signifi cantly decreases the probability of entering the informal sector 
(model 6). Although the Djerma are a minority in Niger, they live in the western 
part of the country and are consequently the majority ethnic group in Niamey. 
Th e Djerma are also the fi rst to have taken up senior positions in the colonial 
administration and army. Moreover, the leaders of Niger from independence 
through 1993 came from this ethnic group.
Ethnic group also has a signifi cant eff ect on access to the public sector in 
Abidjan: members of the Akan, Krou, and Southern Manding ethnic groups 
are 2.2 times as likely to work in the public sector as members of the Northern 
Manding or Voltaic ethnic groups. Th ey are also more likely to work in the for-
mal private sector and less likely to work in the informal sector (models 4 and 6, 
respectively). Th ese fi ndings are consistent with the theory of a social division of 
labor based on ivoirité, which separates the “native” ethnic groups of the south 
from the “nonnative” ethnic groups of the north of CÔte d’Ivoire.8 
Th e public sector in Cotonou and Lomé is more open to migrants (defi ned 
here as people born outside the city) than to nonmigrants, other things equal. 
Th is fi nding runs counter to the expectation that being born in the city gener-
ates social capital that fosters entry into the public sector. It could be interpreted 
as favoritism toward people from certain regions. People from Kozah, the home 
prefecture of presidents Gnassingbé Eyadéma and Faure Gnassingbé (presidents 
of Togo since 1967), are overrepresented in Togo’s public sector, and people 
from Natitingou, the department where Mathieu Kérékou (president of Benin, 
1972–91 and 1996–2006) was born, are overrepresented in the public sector in 
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Benin. In Cotonou, the inequality of opportunities by region of birth is com-
pounded by a signifi cant ethnic group eff ect on access to the public sector: other 
things equal, members of the Fon, the majority ethnic group in Cotonou, are 1.3 
times as likely as members of other ethnic groups to work in the public sector.
In four of the seven cities—Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, and Ouagadougou—
women are less likely to work in the public sector than men, other things equal. 
Access to the Formal Private Sector
Among the least fl uid cities (Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou), only Nia-
mey reveals the direct eff ect of the father’s labor market position on access to 
the formal private sector: having a father who worked in the formal private sec-
tor increases the chances of working in it oneself by a factor of 2.5 (model 4). 
In Bamako and Ouagadougou, other aspects of social origin condition access 
to the formal private sector. In Bamako, being born in the city signifi cantly 
increases access to the formal private sector. One interpretation of this fi nding 
is that being born in Bamako—and implicitly having spent most of one’s life 
there—promotes the development of the social network required to enter the 
formal private sector. In Ouagadougou, everything else equal, the Mossi have 
less chance of entering the formal private sector than other ethnic groups, and 
they are overrepresented in the informal sector (model 6).
Among the most fl uid cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé), the 
father’s institutional sector has no direct eff ect on access to the formal private 
sector in Abidjan and Lomé. Th is result does not hold in Cotonou and Dakar: 
everything else equal, people whose fathers worked in the public sector are 
2.5 times more likely to work in the formal private sector in Cotonou and 1.6 
times more likely to do so in Dakar. Th is fi nding suggests the presence of an 
intergenerational bridge from the public to the private sector. No signifi cant 
eff ect is found for the other aspects of social origin, except in Dakar, where, as in 
Ouagadougou, belonging to the majority ethnic group reduces the probability 
of entering the formal private sector and increases the chances of working in 
the informal sector.
Women in all seven cities are at a disadvantage relative to men when it comes 
to entering the formal private sector.
Access to the Informal Sector
Irrespective of the level of education, having a father who worked in the informal 
sector increases the probability of doing so oneself, except in Abidjan, where it 
has no signifi cant direct eff ect. Th e eff ect of ethnicity diff ers across countries: it 
has no eff ect in Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé; is signifi cantly positive in Dakar 
and Ouagadougou; and is signifi cantly negative in Abidjan and Niamey. Being 
born in the city increases the probability of working in the informal sector in 
Cotonou and Lomé. Th is eff ect is the counterpart of the negative eff ect of birth 
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in the city on access to the public sector. In all cities, everything else equal, 
women have a higher probability of working in the informal sector than men. 
Conclusion
Th is study uses perfectly comparable data to show that social origin in the seven 
West African capitals considered plays a decisive role in determining the sec-
tor of the labor market in which individuals work. Not all cities present the 
same level of inequality of opportunities: cities in the three landlocked countries 
with the lowest levels of human development and wealth (Bamako, Niamey, and 
Ouagadougou) have higher levels of inequality of opportunity than the coastal 
cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé). On average, the level of inequality 
of opportunity in access to an institutional sector is nearly two-thirds higher 
in Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou than in Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, and 
Abidjan. Th is ordering of cities into two groups is robust to the choice of the 
outcome variable considered (institutional sector, socioeconomic group, and 
level of education).9
For the four coastal cities, the intergenerational channels for the transmission 
of inequality are mainly indirect. Entering the public or the formal private sec-
tor depends crucially on the level of education, which is aff ected by the fathers’ 
occupational status. In Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, fathers’ occupa-
tional status also has a direct eff ect on the probability of working in the public 
sector (in Niamey it also aff ects entry into the formal private sector). Th is direct 
intergenerational transmission could refl ect the existence of inheritable social 
or information capital that parents have built up as a result of their position in 
the labor market. In all cities, the likelihood of working in the informal sector is 
much greater, other things equal, if one’s father worked in the informal sector.
A policy to reduce inequality of educational opportunities in Cotonou, 
Dakar, Lomé, and Abidjan would greatly reduce the inequality of opportunities 
in access to diff erent institutional sectors. In Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadou-
gou, however, such a policy would fall short of the mark if the observed direct 
eff ect of the father’s position refl ects inheritable social or information capital 
that parents build up as a result of their position in the labor market. In the 
long run, leveling the educational playing fi eld through extensive changes to 
society’s standards and values could reduce the direct eff ect of fathers’ status on 
labor market position.
Occupational status is not the only aspect of social origin that aff ects labor 
market position. In Abidjan, Dakar, Niamey, and Ouagadougou, ethnicity 
aff ects labor market position, even aft er controlling for migrant status. Belong-
ing to the Djerma group in Niamey and the Akan, Krou, and Southern Manding 
groups in Abidjan signifi cantly raises the chances of entering the public sector 
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or being a wage earner and reduces the probability of working in the informal 
sector. In Dakar and Ouagadougou, belonging to the largest ethnic group in 
the city reduces the chances of entering the formal private sector or being a 
wage earner and increases the likelihood of working in the informal sector. 
In Bamako, Cotonou, and Lomé, migrant status aff ects labor market position. 
Relative to nonmigrants, migrants are more likely to work in the public sector 
and wage jobs in Cotonou and Lomé; in Bamako, they are less likely to work in 
the formal private sector. 
Policies in three areas could increase equality of opportunity in the choice 
of sector: improving the supply of education, increasing demand for education, 
and developing the labor market. Specifi c policies are identifi ed below.
Improving the Supply of Education 
1. Prioritize the poor in public education spending. Public education spending 
in Africa does not prioritize the disadvantaged (Boudon 2006). To remedy 
this situation, some countries, such as Burkina Faso, have defi ned school 
catchment areas to identify areas and populations not served by school ser-
vices and then made more equitable investment choices in terms of new 
establishments and teacher allocations. Th is practice is far from widespread, 
however. Other countries—including many English-speaking countries as 
well as Benin, Madagascar, and Rwanda—have adopted new methods of 
allocating educational resources, such as providing subsidies per pupil to 
cover nonwage expenses. In South Africa, a higher per pupil subsidy is allo-
cated to schools educating poor children or located in poor areas, and the 
teacher-to-pupil ratio is higher in disadvantaged schools. Th ese measures 
have helped reduce the huge inequalities that existed under apartheid
2. Make school more aff ordable by phasing out fees in primary school. One of 
the fi rst African countries to eliminate primary school fees was Malawi, in 
1991. Th e eff ects were immediate: school enrollment rose from 1.9 million in 
1993/94 to 2.9 million in 1999/2000 (Al-Samarrai and Zaman 2007). Uganda 
followed suit in 1997, posting a comparable increase in enrollment. Many 
countries have followed their lead since, including Cameroon in 1999, 
Tanzania in 2001, Zambia in 2002, Madagascar in 2003, and Burundi in 
2005. Th is reform has increased school enrollment rates in all these coun-
tries, particularly among the poorest children and children in rural areas. It 
has not had a positive impact on pupil retention among the poor, however, 
mainly because of a sharp downturn in the quality of education (Oketch and 
Rolleston 2007), highlighting the importance of implementation. 
3. Make the education supply more fl exible and tailor it to the needs of poor pupils 
by relaxing regulations that impede enrollment (requirement to present a birth 
certifi cate on fi rst registration or to be registered by the parents, exclusion of 
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pregnant girls and girls who have given birth); changing the school calendar 
to bring it into line with the agricultural calendar; and developing specifi c 
programs for certain disadvantaged groups, including AIDS orphans, child 
soldiers, disabled children, and others.
4. Ensure access to good education for the most gift ed poor children. Some 
countries encourage the highest-achieving children to enroll in good schools 
that will prepare them to enter higher education. Many African countries 
have prestigious establishments for this purpose—boarding schools and 
selective middle/secondary schools that groom the best pupils for higher 
education. Th e fairness of these programs depends on the selection process 
and whether disadvantaged children and rural children are equitably repre-
sented in these establishments. Attempts to introduce quotas (in Tanzania, 
for example) have rarely been eff ectively or fairly implemented in the long 
run. Some countries have introduced measures targeting underrepresented 
groups. India has set up special boarding schools for underrepresented castes. 
It also runs free boarding schools for girls in rural areas, to encourage them 
to graduate to secondary education. Cost considerations keep this type of 
measure thin on the ground in Africa, but eff orts could be made to develop it.
Increasing Demand for Education 
1. Reduce the indirect costs of education. A number of programs reduce the 
indirect costs of education for the poor, in order to stimulate demand for 
education. Among the most popular are conditional cash transfers and 
school meal programs. Conditional cash transfers are highly developed in 
Latin America. Th ey pay a monthly allowance to poor families on the con-
dition that they send their children to school. Impact assessments of these 
programs generally conclude that they signifi cantly raise school enrollment 
and retention in the school system among the poor (IEG 2011). Projects of 
this kind are being pilot tested in some African countries, including Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Yemen, 
 Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
   Numerous African countries operate school meal programs. Many studies 
have highlighted the positive impact of this type of action on pupil partici-
pation and attendance (Kremer 2003). School meals improve the neediest 
pupils’ learning capacities and provide an incentive for families to send and 
keep their children in school. Th ese programs are especially eff ective because 
they are applied early in the course of education and target schools teaching 
the largest numbers of very poor and vulnerable children.
2. Improve children’s educability. Th e early childhood years are key to the 
development of the human brain. Poor hygiene, malnutrition, and abuse in 
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infancy and early childhood can permanently impair physical, mental, cog-
nitive, and emotional development. Programs combining health care, vac-
cination, nutrition, and stimulation actions for infants and children under 
three can help reduce inequalities in cognitive development. Th e earlier 
these programs begin, the better. 
Developing the Labor Market 
1. Improve access to information on employment opportunities. Little use is 
made of formal job-seeking channels in Africa: in the WAEMU capitals, only 
10 percent of workers fi nd their jobs through formal job-seeking channels. 
Th e rate of job-seeker registration with employment agencies is very low, 
mainly because of the low profi le of such agencies: 65 percent of job- seekers 
not registered with these agencies are simply unaware of their existence. 
Making employment agencies more effi  cient and raising their profi le would 
improve equity of access to the labor market.
2. Help the poor access the credit market. If the direct intergenerational trans-
mission of labor market position works through the transmission of physical 
capital, improving access to the credit market should make for more equal 
opportunities on the labor market.
3. Help the poor create social networks that will serve job-seeking. More than 
60 percent of workers in the WAEMU capitals used their social network to 
fi nd their job. A policy to develop the poor’s social network would prob-
ably reduce the inequality of opportunities in the labor market. One  possible 
course of action would be to develop partnerships between private and pub-
lic enterprise and the training bodies that cater to the disadvantaged.
Annex: Economic and Social Statistics on Seven Countries in West Africa
Table 8A.1 Economic and Social Statistics on Seven Countries in West Africa
Statistic Benin Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Per capita GDP (constant dollars) 313 230 623 208 153 424 248
Gini coefﬁ cent 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.57
Rural population (percentage of total 
population) 58 83 56 70 79 53 67
Human development indicator (rank) 0.420 (158) 0.325 (169) 0.428 (156) 0.386 (164) 0.277 (172) 0.431 (154) 0.493 (141)
Malnutrition weight for age (percentage of 
children under 5) 23 34 21 33 40 23 25
Fertility index (births per woman) 6 7 5 7 8 5 6
Mortality rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) 13 18 17 18 22 12 12
Literacy rate (percentage of children 15 and 
older) 35 22 49 19 29 39 53
Primary completion rate (percent) 53 27 48 27 27 51 78
Gross intake rate (percent) 99 50 78 61 64 85 100
Sources: Data on GDP, rural population, malnutrition, fertility, and mortality are from World Bank 2000. Data on the Gini coefficient are from Amegashie and others 2005. Data on 
human development indicator are from UNDP 2002. Data on literacy are from World Bank 2004. Data on primary completion and gross intake are from UNESCO/BREDA 2005. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Notes
 1. Age 15 was chosen to ensure that all fathers were more or less in the same part 
of their life cycle, particularly their working life cycle, and that their job was the 
one they held just before their children entered the labor market. Comparability 
between individuals’ work and their fathers’ work is guaranteed when individuals are 
examined in the same part of their life cycle as their fathers. We therefore removed 
from the sample all individuals under 35, on the assumption that they had not 
yet reached the level of professional maturity their fathers had achieved when the 
individuals were 15. Retaining only the employed workers whose father worked 
leaves some 1,500 observations per city. Th e nonresponse rates are presented on the 
companion site to this book, http://www.dial.ird.fr/publications.
 2. It would have been useful to compare women’s occupations with their mothers’ 
occupations, as the mother is potentially the main reference for women. However, 
too many observations are lost because of mothers’ low labor force participation. Th e 
methodological choice to use fathers as the benchmark consequently underestimates 
the mobility of women on the whole.
 3. More details on this modeling can be found on the book’s companion site, http://
www.dial.ird.fr/publications. 
 4. Th is coastal/landlocked city division is robust to the change in the defi nition of the 
informal sector: if we defi ne the informal sector for respondents in the same way it 
is defi ned for their fathers (that is, working in a very small business, an association 
or other nonprofi t institution, a household, or self-employment), Bamako, Niamey, 
and Ouagadougou still reveal high levels of unequal opportunities compared with 
Cotonou, Dakar, and Lomé, with Abidjan forming a gray area. 
 5. In the study by Cogneau and others (2007), Côte d’Ivoire, the only country featured 
in both that study and this one, has a much higher level of inequality than the two 
English-speaking countries studied (Ghana and Uganda).
 6. Th e Akan are made up mainly of the Baoulé, Agni, and Ebrié. Th e Krou comprise 
primarily the Bété, Krou, and Bakoué groups. Th e Southern Manding comprises 
the Guro, Dan, and Gagu groups. Other ethnic groups are the Northern Manding 
groups (Dioula, Malinké, Koro, and others) and the Voltaic ethnic groups (Kulango, 
Lobi, Birifor, and others).
 7. In Cotonou, however, having a father who worked in the private sector reduces 
the chances of working in the public sector; in Abidjan, it increases the chances 
compared with individuals whose fathers worked in the informal sector. Th ese fi nd-
ings refl ect more than the intergenerational transmission of labor market position, 
however. Th ey are a sign of the social distance between sectors, especially the short 
distance between the public and formal private sectors in Cotonou and the long 
social distance between the public and informal sectors in Abidjan, where the public 
and formal private sectors are very close (see panel d in fi gure 8.1).
 8. According to Banégas (2007, p. 28), under the fi rst president of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny, “the economic and social integration of foreigners in urban 
areas came about relatively easily in the form of a social division of labor, a legacy of 
the colonial buy-in policy, which could be summed up by the following formula: to 
the people of Ivoirian ‘extraction’ (the term in use today to describe the populations 
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of the South) go the salaried jobs in the administration and the large public and 
semi-public corporations…; to foreigners and Northerners (especially Dioula) go 
small trade, transport and casual jobs in the informal sector.”
 9. Th ese robustness checks are presented on the companion site to this book, http://
www.dial.ird.fr/publications.
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